Who is the man here below who has never committed a sin, tell me? He who had never committed one, how could he have lived, tell me? If, because I do evil, you punish me with evil, what difference is there between you and me, tell me?
where the latter argues in favor of the possibility for God to renege on his threat of punishment (khulf al-waʿīd) .
focusing on an aspect of Ibn ʿArabī's eschatology which may prove useful in comparing the two theories further: the concept of punishment that lies at the root of Ibn ʿArabī's theory. What does infernal punishment actually involve? And which legal model of punishment does it match? Ibn ʿArabī's own speculations on the nature of eschatological castigation are part and parcel of his reflections about the notion of punishment, which are in turn a recurring motif in his legal thought. For the topic to be covered suitably, a thorough catalogue and correlation of the many relevant passages scattered throughout Ibn ʿArabī's entire works would be necessary. The task would be all the more difficult because Ibn ʿArabī's writing is more akin to hermeneutics than to philosophy or theology. His aim, in the field of eschatology as elsewhere, is to disclose the multiple aspects (wujūh, lit. "faces") of the Revelation rather than giving a systematic presentation of doctrine. Moreover, without having to subscribe to any schools, Ibn ʿArabī is able to find a wajh ṣaḥīḥ (an aspect that is real and true) in the disparate opinions voiced in Islamic systematic theology (kalām), philosophy ( falsafa) and Sufism, including those distrusted by the heresiographers.
My own knowledge does not extend far enough for such an undertaking; I will, however, endeavour to determine major themes. The positions taken by Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn al-Qayyim, following the principle that things can be discerned through their opposites, will help identify these themes, that is to say those sensitive points in Ibn ʿArabī's outlook that may have triggered a creative response in the two Ḥanbalīs. Among these issues, the notion of punishment appears to me to be of particular relevance.
Thus, prior to illustrating some of Ibn ʿArabī's ideas on the topic (sections 3 and 4), Ibn al-Qayyim's position will be covered, dwelling primarily on the jurisdictional-political element (section 2). We cannot proceed, however, without first of all covering the essential features of the ongoing debate on the eternity of hell in the realm of Islam before the seventh/thirteenth century (section 1). I make no pretence of exhausting the topic, but doing so will allow me to clarify the approach taken in this paper.
See Ibn al-Qayyim, Ḥādī 352. Ibn al-Qayyim supports the same theory. See ibid., 383-4. Ibn al-Qayyim remarks that one should not reject the theory of the annihilation of the Fire only because "innovators" have supported it (ibid., 364). In fact, both Ibn ʿArabī and Ibn Taymiyya limit binding consensus to the Salaf, making room for the adoption of opinions rejected as "innovations" by the majority of the Sunni schools. Finally, it should be remembered that Ibn Taymiyya, at least in his formative years, held a favorable view of Ibn ʿArabī. See Ajhar, Suʾāl 119-21; Khalil, Salvation 87; Manāʿī, ʿAqīda 101. However, Ibn Taymiyya rejected Ibn ʿArabī's views of hell. See ibid., 96; Chodkiewicz, Procès 102.
